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Abstract 
 
In some European countries, teachers select 
students for entry into different secondary school 
tracks on the basis of students’ achievement level. In 
Luxembourg, teachers join a council to select students. 
PISA provided evidence that students with an 
immigration background and/or low socioeconomic 
status are underrepresented in the highest school 
track. The question arises whether teachers’ tracking 
decisions are biased towards non-performance related 
cues. Dual process theories of judgment formation 
suggest accountability to be a moderator of judgment 
accuracy. Judgments of highly accountable teachers 
should be less biased by non-performance related cues 
than those of teachers with low accountability. In 
groups such as the teacher councils, diffusion of 
responsibility may occur, thereby reducing 
accountability of the individual group members. We 
designed two experiments to investigate whether 
teachers’ tracking decisions differ under different 
levels of accountability. In both studies, teachers in the 
high accountability condition did rely solely on 
performance related cues. Increasing accountability 
for teachers’ decisions could reduce biases in tracking 
decisions for students with immigration background 
and low socioeconomic status.   
 
1. Introduction 
 
Educational systems differ within Europe and they 
differ between Europe and the USA. Nevertheless, 
they also share some aspects. One such aspect which is 
common in different European educational systems is 
school tracking. For instance, in Germany, 
Switzerland, Austria, and Luxembourg, the educational 
system consists of different secondary school tracks 
that are situated in different schools, and tracking is 
based on students’ achievement levels. These tracks 
differ in the qualifications the students can acquire, 
ranging from a qualification for university entrance to 
a qualification for very limited job areas. Similarly, in 
the US, students are placed in academic or vocational 
tracks, or in advanced, regular, or remedial tracks in 
secondary school. Tracking is used to ensure that 
students with similar/comparable academic abilities 
share the same classroom environments and instruction 
[1]. Empirical research on tracking in different 
countries has provided evidence that students with low 
socioeconomic status (SES) and minority students are 
disadvantaged. In Germany and Luxembourg for 
example, students with an  immigration background 
and low SES are overrepresented in the lowest school 
track (where they can only acquire a qualification for 
limited vocational education) whereas they are 
underrepresented on the highest school track (where 
they can acquire a qualification for university entrance) 
[2]. In many European countries with tracking systems, 
primary school teachers decide upon the placement in 
the secondary school track. 
 In Luxembourg, students are tracked after six years 
of primary school into three clearly hierarchical school 
tracks. Students are oriented toward the Enseignement 
Secondaire (ES) when their academic achievement is 
above average. Students can acquire a qualification for 
university entrance when they successfully attend this 
school track. Students with average academic 
achievement are generally placed in the Enseignement 
Secondaire Technique (EST). Here they can also 
acquire a qualification for university entrance but the 
education is more vocational in nature, as students are 
prepared for different job areas. Students with major 
learning difficulties and below average achievement 
profiles are oriented toward the Enseignement 
Préparatoire (PREP). Students who attend this school 
track can acquire qualifications for very limited job 
areas. The tracking decision is made by a council 
consisting of the students’ primary teacher, one 
secondary school teacher of each secondary school 
track, and the responsible school inspector. However, 
in groups such as the teacher councils, processes of 
diffusion of responsibility may occur [3], which may 
reduce the accountability of the individual group 
members. 
In Luxembourg, the tracking decision is of 
particular importance for the students’ future academic 
careers because the council’s decision is mandatory, 
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i.e. parents must follow this decision and are not 
allowed to freely choose a secondary school track for 
their children. Because of the importance of the 
tracking decisions for students’ future careers, our 
study asked the question whether increasing the 
accountability of decision makers would decrease any 
bias in the  decisions made. 
Large-scale studies try to answer the question of 
which student cues are taken into account when 
teachers make their decisions. There is ample evidence 
that school grades and academic achievement are the 
best predictors of teachers’ tracking decisions [2]. In 
addition, social factors like immigration background 
and parents’ socioeconomic and educational status also 
predicted teachers’ decisions, even  after controlling 
for academic ability  [2]. Nevertheless, by employing 
multiple regression analyses, these studies suffer from 
high intercorrelations between the predictor variables 
analyzed. For instance, school grades and scores of 
achievement tests are highly correlated with the 
socioeconomic background of students [4]. This 
methodological problem affects the results of the 
multiple regression analyses and limits the predictive 
validity of the results [5]. Thus, the aim of our study 
was to investigate whether teachers’ tracking decisions 
were biased against immigration background and SES 
when using an experimental setting with a set of 
independent predictors.  
 
2. Theoretical Background 
 
Dual process theories of impression and judgment 
formation [6][7] suggest that people generally tend to 
rely on salient cues when processing information about 
a target person and when forming an impression or 
judgment of a target person. The more salient the cues 
are, the stronger is their influence on the resulting 
judgment. Each piece of information to which 
perceivers attend in a particular situational context 
might be considered a salient cue [7]. For instance, 
when teachers are giving written grades, not only the 
achievement score in a test might be a salient cue, but 
also a student’s handwriting style. In another situation, 
for example, when giving oral grades, salient cues 
might include the correctness of a given answer or the 
manner in which the answer is given. Thus, the 
salience of cues differs from situation to situation, 
thereby also varying the extent to which they are used 
for impression and judgment formation.  
Dual process models assume that there are two 
different ways of social information processing and 
judgment formation. One way is relatively automatic 
and relies on cues which activate social stereotypes. 
This category-based [7] or heuristic [8] strategy often 
results in judgments which are biased through the 
activated stereotype. This process has the advantage 
that it occurs quickly and without much cognitive 
effort, thereby saving cognitive capacity. In this way of 
judgment formation, cues are salient when activating 
stereotypes. As a consequence, mainly stereotype-
related cues become important when considering the 
given target person’s attributes. The other, more 
controlled strategy is information integrating [7] or 
rule-based [8] processing, where cues are considered 
salient when they provide the perceiver with an 
accurate judgment, as they are unrelated to stereotypes 
but instead refer to the attributes of the target person 
(e.g., individual behaviours or performance related 
cues).  
In many situations, the motivation of the perceiver 
determines which type of information processing 
comes into play [6][7]. In case of low motivation to 
form an accurate judgment, people tend to rely on the 
heuristic strategy using salient cues originating from 
social stereotypes, which often leads to a biased 
judgment. However, in case of high motivation to form 
an accurate judgment, people tend to use the rule-based 
strategy, which relies on attributes of the individual 
target person [6][7]. One factor contributing to 
variation in accuracy motivation is accountability [9]. 
People feeling highly accountable for their judgments 
engage more in rule-based thinking and judgment 
formation than people who feel less accountable. Less 
accountable persons engage more in heuristic thinking. 
Accountability may be increased by emphasizing the 
importance of the decision [10] and by highlighting 
personal responsibility for the decision. The 
responsibility for the decision may be increased by the 
need to justify the judgment to others [10]. 
Dual process models can also be applied to person 
judgment formation in professional domains [11], 
particularly in the educational domain [12]. For 
example, it was demonstrated that teachers who were 
made to feel accountable by emphasizing the 
importance of their decisions made less heuristic 
judgments than teachers who felt less accountable 
because their decisions had no further consequences 
[12].  
 
3. Research Question 
 
In the Luxembourgish school system, a council 
makes the tracking decision. Although the primary 
school teachers have an important say in this decision 
(their opinion/vote counts double), the council and not 
the individual teacher is held responsible for the 
decision.  Hence, the individual teacher might attribute 
the responsibility to other group members and not to 
him- or herself. In group decisions, a diffusion of 
responsibility may occur [3], since the individual group 
members do not feel as accountable as an individual 
decision maker. Thus, it might be possible that primary 
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school teachers feel low accountability when making 
their tracking decisions in a group. Even when the 
decision is highly important for the students’ future 
careers, teachers’ perceived accountability for the 
decision might be low because they are not solely 
responsible for the judgment and it is up to the council 
to justify the decision to the parents. 
According to dual process models of impression 
and judgment formation, which assume accountability 
as a moderator of judgment formation as has been 
outlined above, tracking decisions might be improved, 
i.e. less affected by stereotypes, when the perceived 
accountability of the decision makers is increased. 
Thus, we expected teachers who feel relatively less 
accountable for their decisions to tend to use the 
heuristic strategy and consider stereotypical person 
attributes. Within the domain of teachers’ assessments, 
the stereotypes that teachers frequently use include 
socio-economic background (SES) and immigration 
status of students [13]. Consequently, the heuristic 
strategy should encourage teachers to not only use 
performance related cues, such as the school grades 
and the test scores, but also non-performance related 
cues like immigration background and/or SES to form 
a judgment. Accountability should decrease when 
teachers have no need to justify their decisions to 
others, for instance to the parents, and when the 
decision is of no particular importance for the teacher 
or for the student. In contrast, teachers who feel more 
accountable should use a rule-based strategy 
employing the rule that performance related cues of the 
individual student provide the best information for 
making an accurate decision. Accountability should 
increase when teachers have to justify their decisions 
and they are personally accountable for the judgment, 
and when the decisions are highly important for the 
students’ lives. Furthermore, we expected teachers who 
make decisions as a member of the council to be more 
likely to employ the heuristic strategy to make a 
judgment compared to teachers who make decisions 
individually. Therefore, we expected teachers to 
consider immigration background or SES of the 
student while forming the judgment as a member of the 
council.  
We designed two studies to investigate these 
hypotheses. In both studies, Luxembourgish primary 
school teachers participated. In Study 1, participants 
were required to make tracking decisions for 16 
fictitious students. In Study 2, participants had the 
same task but were additionally requiring think aloud 
while gathering information and making decisions.  
 
4. Study 1 
 
Teachers received vignettes describing 16 fictitious 
students. Teachers were asked to decide which 
secondary school track each student should attend. 
When participants had finished reading and judging, 
they completed a questionnaire assessing their 
demographic characteristics and their perceived 
accountability for the tracking decisions in the study.  
 
4.1. Participants and Design 
 
Fifty-four Luxembourgish primary school teachers 
(34 female) with a mean age of 37.98 years (SD = 
11.06) participated in Study 1. We recruited 
participants via the school presidents and the school 
inspectors. Teachers had a mean teaching experience in 
Luxembourgish primary schools of 14 years (SD = 
10.99). Teachers received no payment for their 
participation. 
We varied the degree of accountability between 
participants, which resulted in three conditions (high, 
low, council). Participants were randomly and in equal 
number allocated to the conditions. Moreover, cues in 
the student descriptions were varied within the 
participants. The profile of each student consisted of 
seven cues:  school grades, test scores, nationality, 
SES, working and learning habits, social behaviors, 
and gender. Our dependent variable was the tracking 
decision.  
 
4.2. Materials 
 
In each vignette, the student description entailed 
seven cues which were (1) school grades in the main 
subjects. In Luxembourg, the main school subjects are 
German, French, and Mathematics. The grades were 
averaged across the subcomponents of the school 
subjects (e.g. in German: reading, writing, speaking) 
and across the last year of primary school; (2) Scores 
of standardized school performance tests conducted in 
the main subjects were provided as percentages of 
correctly answered questions averaged across the 
subcomponents (e.g. in French: reading 
comprehension, grammar, listening comprehension); 
(3) working and learning habits shown in descriptions 
of how the students did their homework and whether 
they fully used the time given for written work or had 
problems finishing their written work in a reasonable 
period of time; (4) social behaviours illustrated by 
information about the students’ behaviour during 
instructions and school recess; (5) nationality 
information given indirectly through the language the 
students spoke at home; (6) socio-economic status 
indicated by the occupation of the students’ fathers; (7) 
gender.  
The cues were constructed as dichotomous 
variables. School grades were either above or below 
average, test scores were either high or low, working 
and learning habits as well as social behaviours were 
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either positive or negative, nationality was either with 
or without immigration background, socio-economic 
status was either high or low, and gender either male or 
female.  
 Cues were combined in a way that ensured that for 
any combination of the values of the cues the 
intercorrelations between the cues were minimal. In 
fact, school grades, test scores, nationality, and SES 
were completely independent from each other, which 
resulted in 16 case descriptions containing four cues 
with zero intercorrelations. To complete the case 
descriptions, the remaining three cues were added by 
distributing the values of these cues randomly to the 16 
cases, yielding maximum intercorrelations of r = .25. 
To manipulate accountability, we created three 
different instructions. In the high accountability 
instructions, teachers were asked to imagine that they 
were solely responsible for the tracking decisions and 
that these decisions would influence the future 
educational and occupational careers of the students. In 
the low accountability instruction, teachers were asked 
to imagine a situation in which a colleague would ask 
them for advice concerning the tracking decisions for 
the students of his class and that they were just 
required to provide their opinion without commitment. 
In the council instruction, teachers were asked to 
prepare the tracking decisions for the council and were 
informed that the final tracking decisions would be 
made by the council. This instruction corresponded to 
the actual tracking procedure in Luxembourg.  
To validate the different instructions, six 
Luxembourgish primary school teachers read the 
different instructions and rated their perceived 
accountability for each set of instructions on a Likert-
Scale ranging from 0 (no perceived accountability at 
all) to 5 (high perceived accountability). We computed 
simple effect tests to investigate whether the different 
instructions induced different levels of perceived 
accountability. Teachers felt more accountable after 
reading the high accountability instruction (M = 5.00, 
SD = 0.00) than after reading the low accountability 
instruction (M = 2.67, SD = 1.37), t(5) = 4.18, d = 2.41, 
p < .01 (one-tailed). The council instructions produced 
marginally lower perceived accountability (M = 4.5, 
SD = 0.84) than the high accountability instructions, 
t(5) = 1.46, d = 0.84, p = .10 (one-tailed), and 
significantly higher accountability than the low 
accountability instructions, t(5) =  2.20, d = 1.61, p < 
.05 (one-tailed).   
 
4.3. Procedure 
 
A test booklet containing the 16 vignettes with 
student descriptions was administered. We randomly 
allocated participants to one of the three different 
experimental accountability conditions. The 
instructions were printed on the first page of the 
booklet. Then the 16 case descriptions were presented 
in random order. After each case description, 
participants were asked to decide upon the appropriate 
secondary school track for the described student, 
choosing between three options: ES (highest track); 
EST (middle track); and PREP (lowest track). 
Participants had the opportunity to look at all 16 
descriptions before making their judgments. After 
finishing the 16 student descriptions, participants were 
required to fill out a questionnaire assessing personal 
data such as gender, age, and teaching experience. To 
check our accountability manipulation, teachers were 
additionally asked to indicate their perceived 
accountability during the task on a percentage scale 
ranging from 0 (no perceived accountability) to 100 
(highest perceived accountability). In the end, 
participants were thanked and debriefed.    
 
4.4. Results 
 
4.4.1. Manipulation check. To check whether our 
instructions induced different levels of accountability, 
we conducted a one-way ANOVA with the ratings of 
perceived accountability as dependent variable. 
ANOVA yielded a significant main effect, F(2,49) = 
3.45, p2 = 0.12, p < .05. The high accountability 
instruction induced a higher degree of accountability 
(M = 85.67, SD = 16.21) than the low accountability 
instruction (M = 68.35, SD = 25.57), t(33) = 2.41,  d = 
0.81, p < .05 (one-tailed). The mean rating for the 
council instructions (M = 78.71, SD = 16.05) did not 
significantly differ from the high accountability 
instructions, t(33) = 1.09, d = 0.43, p = .14 (one-tailed). 
However, there was a marginally significant difference 
between the council instructions the low accountability 
instructions, t(32) = 1.55, d = 0.49, p = .07 (one-tailed). 
 
4.4.2. Tracking decisions. First, we analysed how 
often each track was recommended; 42.47 % were ES-
decisions, 51.39 % were EST-decisions, and 6.13 % 
were PREP-decisions. These data corresponded to the 
actual tracking decisions in Luxembourg [14],  
supporting the ecological validity of our experimental 
procedure. Because teachers chose the PREP track for 
only a few students, we dichotomized the tracking 
decisions into ES- and non-ES-decisions. To test our 
hypotheses regarding the influence of different levels 
of accountability, we conducted a multiple logistic 
regression analysis for each experimental condition 
using this dichotomous criterion (see Table 1 for all 
odds ratios).  
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Table 1. Odds ratios for the seven cues in 
each accountability condition in Study 1. 
 
 low 
account-
ability 
council high account-
ability 
school grades 85.18* 31.86* 50.67* 
test scores 14.01* 12.32* 10.26* 
Nationality 3.21* 1.84 1.68 
SES 1.20 1.54 1.53 
working and 
learning habits 
2.42 2.01 2.81* 
social behavior  1.53 1.38 1.50 
gender  2.04 2.11 1.56 
Note: * p<.05 
 
For the high accountability condition, the 
performance related cues school grades, test scores, 
and working and learning habits predicted teachers’ 
tracking decisions, whereby higher scores were 
associated with a higher chance of choosing the highest 
track. In the low accountability condition, working and 
learning habits was not considered as significant cue. 
However, only in the low accountability condition 
teachers’ tracking decisions were additionally based on 
the nationality of the student as non-performance 
related cue. More specifically, in the low 
accountability condition and given similar academic 
performances of pupils, students without immigration 
background had approximately a three times higher 
chance of being recommended to the highest track than 
students with immigration background.  
 
4.5. Discussion 
 
Drawing on dual process models [6][7] and the 
notion of accountability as a moderator of judgment 
formation [9], we designed Study 1 to test whether 
different levels of accountability could influence 
teachers’ tracking decisions.  
We expected that teachers in the low accountability 
condition or deciding as members of a council would 
employ a heuristic judgment formation strategy 
whereas teachers in the high accountability condition 
would use a rule-based strategy. Heuristic judgment 
formation would be indicated by considering non-
performance related cues such as immigration 
background or the SES of the student for the decision 
while the rule-based strategy was indicated by taking 
solely the performance related information into 
consideration. As expected, decisions of teachers who 
felt a low degree of accountability were influenced by 
immigration background of the student, suggesting the 
use of a heuristic strategy. Even though we took care 
that performance related and nationality related 
information were uncorrelated, we found an influence 
of the immigration background of the student in the 
low accountability condition. This finding corresponds 
with the results of large-scale studies, which have 
provided evidence that immigration background is a 
predictor of teachers’ tracking decisions [2]. Thus, in 
the low accountability condition, teachers’ tracking 
decisions seem to be affected by immigration 
background even though students share the same level 
of academic achievement. In contrast, teachers who felt 
highly accountable for their tracking decisions relied 
solely on performance related cues, adopting a rule-
based strategy. Thus, one factor which could turn 
heuristic judgment formation into rule-based judgment 
formation is accountability. This implies that making 
teachers highly accountable for their tracking decisions 
by giving them sole responsibility for making their 
decisions and communicating these to students and 
parents,  could improve the objectiveness (and possibly 
the accuracy) of their judgments [9] in the sense that 
only performance related cues would be weighted to 
form a judgment. 
For teachers who made their decision as members 
of the council, Study 1 provided inconsistent results. 
We expected teachers who made their decisions in the 
council and who had no need to justify their decisions 
to others to exhibit heuristic processing. The regression 
analysis for the tracking decisions indicated a rule-
based strategy, as teachers solely relied on 
performance related cues. It is possible that teachers 
felt more accountable in the council condition because 
they had two votes and, therefore, their judgment 
weighed more in the council’s decision. The 
manipulation check confirms a medium level of 
perceived accountability between high and low 
accountability, as the council condition did not differ 
from the high accountability condition. This 
unexpectedly high induced level of accountability may 
have produced this unexpected result. 
In sum, the results of Study 1 imply that teachers’ 
judgments may be biased through non-performance 
related cues, particularly immigration background, 
under low accountability conditions. Minority students 
do frequently show lower academic performance than 
students without immigration background [15]. 
Because immigration background was completely 
independent of academic performance in our vignettes, 
however, we can rule out the possibility that the 
relationship between nationality and tracking decision 
was a side-effect of an empirical relationship between 
performance and nationality. To our knowledge, this is 
the first demonstration of the influence of immigration 
information on teachers’ judgments which is not also 
confounded by performance related information.  
Nevertheless, Study 1 is limited in several ways. 
First, the vignettes were administered as a booklet and 
the participants could make their decisions after 
reading all student descriptions. This may have 
induced a frame of reference effect, on which teachers 
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may have relied [16]. This fact could have contributed 
to the results, since teachers could compare the 
students’ cues and adjust their decisions accordingly. 
Teachers’ judgments often depend on the achievement 
level of the class [16]. Second, due to the booklet 
format, we were not able to gain insight into 
information processing during judgment formation.  
 
5. Study 2 
 
To address the limitations of Study 1, we presented 
each vignette via computer in Study 2, ensuring that 
teachers had to work on the student descriptions one at 
a time. Additionally, by using a computer, we were 
able to assess reading times and judgment latencies to 
get a deeper insight into cognitive processes during 
judgment formation. Because heuristic information 
processing and judgment formation occurs quickly 
while rule-based processing is more time-consuming 
[17] reading times and judgment latencies could be 
additional indicators for the different processing 
strategies. Thus, we expected that reading times and 
judgment latencies should be decreased in the low 
accountability and council condition compared to the 
high accountability condition.  
Moreover, complexity of thoughts increases as 
accountability increases [10]. Therefore, we used a 
think aloud method to shed more light on cognitive 
processes. We expected that thoughts should be more 
complex in the high accountability condition than in 
the low accountability or council conditions. 
Regarding the tracking decisions, we tested the same 
hypotheses as in Study 1.   
 
5.1. Participants and Design 
 
Sixty Luxembourgish (34 female) primary school 
teachers participated in Study 2. We recruited 
participants via the school inspectors. Teachers had an 
average of 15.98 (SD = 10.77) years’ experience 
working in primary schools and were on average 40.08 
(SD = 10.66) years old. Teachers received no payment 
for their participation. As in Study 1, we varied the 
accountability level between participants and included 
the same seven cues (predictor variables). Dependent 
variables were the tracking decisions, the reading 
times, and judgment latencies.  
 
5.2. Materials 
 
We used the same vignettes as in Study 1 with three 
minor modifications. One modification concerned the 
school grades, which were averaged across the school 
year but divided into the subcomponents of the school 
subjects. More specifically, the German and French 
school grades were split into: (1) one grade for writing, 
and (2) one grade for speaking. The second 
modification concerned the information about test 
scores, where we now provided the score percentiles 
for the students. This had the advantage that the 
information was independent of the task difficulty and 
that teachers could see how the students’ test scores 
were ranked within the whole cohort. The third 
modification was that we also provided the test scores 
for the individual subtests. The modifications derived 
from an advice of some school inspectors who 
validated the materials. 
 
5.3. Procedure 
 
We visited participants in their schools. We 
randomly allocated teachers to one of the three 
accountability conditions. Participants were seated in 
front of the computer screen and then the first set of 
instructions appeared, informing participants about the 
procedure of the study and the Think aloud 
requirement. After this, the accountability instructions 
appeared on the computer screen. Subsequently, the 16 
student descriptions were presented. Teachers had to 
make the tracking decision for each of the 16 students 
by pressing “1” to indicate ES, “2” to indicate EST, 
and  “3” to indicate PREP. During teachers’ work on 
the student descriptions, the experimenter recorded 
teachers’ thoughts with a voice recorder. After 
finishing the last student description, teachers were 
asked to fill out the same demographic questionnaire 
and rank their perceived accountability as in Study 1. 
Finally, participants were debriefed and thanked.  
 
5.4. Results 
 
5.4.1. Manipulation check. To check whether our 
instructions induced different levels of perceived 
accountability, we conducted a one-way ANOVA. The 
ANOVA yielded no significant results, F < 1. Teachers 
in the high accountability condition (M = 77.50, SD = 
17.81) felt as accountable as teachers in the council (M 
= 76.00, SD = 20.81) and in the low accountability 
condition (M = 74.44, SD = 28.59). 
 
5.4.2. Tracking decisions. First, we analysed how 
often teachers recommended each secondary school 
type; 42.08 % decisions were made for the highest 
track, 52.29 % for the middle track whilst the lowest 
track was recommended in 5.63 % of all cases. As in 
Study 1, these results correspond to the actual tracking 
recommendations in Luxembourg. As in Study 1, we 
dichotomized the tracking decisions into ES- and non-
ES decisions. In our further analyses, we used this 
dichotomous variable as criterion. To investigate the 
influence of accountability on teachers’ tracking 
decisions, we analysed the tracking decisions using 
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multiple logistic regression analysis for each 
experimental (accountability level) condition (see 
Table 2 for all odds ratios). 
 
Table 2. Odds ratios for the seven cues in 
each accountability condition in Study 2. 
 
 low 
account-
ability 
council high account-
ability 
school grades 237.51* 75.93* 46.19* 
test scores 153.60* 27.38* 63.23* 
nationality 1.62 1.93 0.93 
SES 0.69 0.77 0.66 
working and 
learning habits 
1.83 5.17* 2.90* 
social behavior  1.05 1.70 1.22 
gender  1.08 1.98 1.19 
Note: * p<.05 
 
Irrespective of accountability level, teachers’ 
tracking decisions were based on school grades and 
test scores. Working and learning habits were 
additionally taken into account by participants in the 
council and the high accountability condition. 
 
5.4.3. Reading Times. The time participants needed to 
read each vignette was assessed. To ensure that reading 
times not depend on length of student descriptions, we 
divided the reading time for the whole description of a 
student by the number of characters. We submitted 
these relative reading times to a one-way ANOVA 
with accountability (low vs. high vs. council) as factor. 
The main effect did not reach significance, F < 1. 
 
5.4.4. Judgment latencies. The time participants 
needed to make the tracking decisions for each student 
was assessed. To test our hypotheses regarding 
judgment latencies in ms, we conducted a one-way 
ANOVA with accountability (low vs. high vs. council) 
as factor. ANOVA results revealed no significant main 
effect of accountability condition, F < 1.10. 
 
5.4.5. Reference to cues. We consulted think aloud 
protocols to investigate whether teachers referred to 
the different cues and how often they considered the 
different cues in their thoughts, as an indicator of 
thought complexity. One independent judge rated the 
protocols corresponding to the reference frequency of 
each cue. Because each cue consisted of a different 
amount of information (i.e. school grades consisted of 
five pieces of information; working and learning habits 
consisted of three pieces of information), we divided 
these frequencies by the number of pieces of 
information to ensure that the references of the 
different cues were comparable. The resulting relative 
numbers of references were submitted to a 3 x 7 mixed 
ANOVA with accountability (low vs. high vs. council) 
as between-subjects factor and cue (school grades vs. 
test scores vs. nationality vs. SES vs. working and 
learning habits vs. social behavior vs. gender) as 
within-subjects factor. The ANOVA yielded a main 
effect for cue, F(6, 336) = 57.57, p2 = 0.51, p < .001 
(see Table 3 for all means and standard deviations). 
 
Table 3. Means and standard deviations for 
the relative numbers of references of the cues 
in Study 2. 
 
 mean SD 
school grades 5.71 3.03 
test scores 2.97 1.60 
nationality 3.22 4.25 
SES 2.88 4.62 
working and learning habits 12.95 9.80 
social behavior  5.94 4.62 
gender  0.63 1.63 
 
In order to investigate the question whether the 
number of references had an effect on the importance 
of cues in the accountability conditions, we compared 
the number of references between conditions for those 
cues which differed in their weight for the tracking 
decisions. These were immigration background as well 
as working and learning habits. We found no 
differences between the accountability conditions, all 
Fs < 1. 
 
5.5. Discussion 
 
Study 2 provided new results on the effects of 
accountability: High accountability induced rule-based 
processing, as teachers solely relied on performance 
related cues, but the council instruction had the same 
effect. Teachers in the low accountability condition did 
not rely on all performance related cues, as they did 
not consider working and learning habits when making 
their decisions. This finding contradicts our 
assumptions. Results regarding the frequency of cue 
reference showed that participants referred to almost 
all cues but they did not consider all cues in decision 
making. This suggests that even though teachers 
thought about for instance, SES, they did not rely on 
SES while making the decision. This might be due to 
the special think aloud situation, in which teachers 
were always monitored by the experimenter. The 
presence of others often induces the desire to be 
socially correct [19]. Perhaps teachers thought they 
were required to be socially and politically correct, 
thus considering non-performance related cues in 
thoughts but not in decisions. Finally, in contrast to our 
expectations, accountability had no influence on 
reading times and judgment latencies. These results 
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also imply an influence of the experimental think aloud 
situation.  
 
6. General Discussion 
 
In Luxembourg, students are selected for entry into 
different secondary school tracks depending on their 
achievement level. Research has provided evidence 
that students with immigration background and low 
SES are underrepresented in the highest track. Hence, 
we designed two studies to investigate whether 
teachers’ tracking decisions are biased through non-
performance related cues. Drawing on dual process 
theories [6][7] and the idea that accountability 
functions as a moderator of information processing and 
judgment formation [9], we examined whether the 
decision making process could be improved (i.e. 
become less biased) by making teachers highly 
accountable for their decisions. The results of our two 
studies support the assumption that teachers who feel 
highly accountable for their decisions employ the rule-
based strategy, resulting in more accurate (less biased) 
performance related judgments.  
Study 1 showed that high accountable teachers 
solely relied on performance related cues whereas 
teachers in the low accountability condition 
additionally took non-performance related cues into 
account. Teachers who made their decisions as a 
member of the council did not consider non-
performance related cues in their tracking decisions. 
However, the results of Study 1 are inconsistent with 
the results of Study 2. Contrary to Study 1, teachers 
who felt low accountability took only performance 
related cues into account, but they did not rely on 
working and learning habits. In Study 2, our 
manipulation check showed that the accountability 
manipulation did not work as well as in Study 1. The 
inconsistency between the results of Study 1 and Study 
2 might therefore be due to the differences in 
accountability elicited in the two experiments. In Study 
1, participants worked on the vignettes and were 
required to make tracking decisions. In Study 2, 
teachers were asked to express their thoughts verbally 
during the decision making process. Thus, the different 
experimental situations might have evoked different 
types of accountability per se, as Study 1 only induced 
outcome accountability whereas Study 2 elicited 
process accountability. Outcome accountability 
matches our accountability manipulation: participants 
had to account for their judgments [20], particularly for 
their tracking decisions. Therefore, our accountability 
manipulation worked well in Study 1, as the 
experimental situation and the accountability 
instruction only affected participants’ outcome 
accountability. In contrast, the think aloud procedure 
might have provoked process accountability; that is, 
participants might have felt the need to account for the 
ways they processed the given information [20], 
particularly as participants were required to explain the 
way they made their decisions. As a result, in Study 2, 
the experimental situation and the accountability 
instructions might have induced both process and 
outcome accountability. The results imply that process 
accountability could have overruled the effects of 
outcome accountability, as process accountability is 
suggested to elicit rule-based decision making [20]. 
One may conclude that introducing a strategy that 
induces process accountability could also be a valuable 
tool in improving teachers’ decisions. Asking teachers, 
for instance, to explain how they review the student 
information and use it to come to a decision could 
induce process accountability and thus lead to unbiased 
decisions. 
Our experimental results add to the results of large-
scale studies. They also show that students with 
immigration background are disadvantaged when it 
comes to school tracking decisions. Considering the 
fact that Luxembourgish teachers make tracking 
decisions as members of a council and that under these 
conditions accountability for the decision might be 
low, our results may provide one possible explanation 
of the disadvantage of students with an immigration 
background in Luxembourg. Nevertheless, further 
research is needed, as our student descriptions were 
fictitious and teachers were provided with minimal 
information about the students. Future research should 
rely on authentic student information to see whether 
these cases solicit similar results. However, relying on 
authentic student information always implies high 
correlations between different student cues [15], which 
makes it harder to separate the effects of different 
predictors. In contrast, experimentally created student 
descriptions provide the exclusive procedure to 
disentangle influences of performance and non-
performance related cues to estimate the actual weights 
of non-performance related cues in teachers’ tracking 
decisions. Future research should combine both 
authentic student information and experimental 
procedures to investigate the validity of experimental 
results. One could also argue that our findings stem 
from a non-naturalistic setting and that the results of 
our studies do not hold for teachers’ tracking practice 
in daily life. However, the data concerning the 
recommendation frequency for each track 
corresponded to the distribution of actual tracking 
decisions. Accountability improved tracking decisions 
in an experimental situation which had no real 
consequences for students or teachers.  One could 
expect even stronger effects when increasing 
accountability among teachers in real-life settings, 
because in this case actual consequences for teachers 
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and students will follow, which should further induce 
perceptions of accountability. 
Our results have implications for tracking decision 
procedures. Considering the main finding of our 
studies (i.e. high accountability leads to rule-based 
judgments), introducing a procedure that ensures that 
teachers are accountable for tracking decisions and that 
permanently makes teachers aware of their 
responsibility for the future of students may be 
valuable in reducing the disadvantage of students with 
immigration background and low SES. In addition, the 
question arises whether tracking decisions should be 
made as individual or as group decisions. Further 
research should explore whether increased 
accountability in groups can improve group decisions 
as well as increased accountability in individual 
teachers. However, increasing accountability in 
teachers’ judgment procedures irrespective of 
individual or group decisions could be a valuable tool 
in improving teachers’ judgments about students.  
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